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ABSTRACT 
Several studies have shown that lifeboat was not as safe as it was supposed to be. 
Even though there is less number of lifeboat accidents that contribute to the total 
shipping accidents, lifeboat accidents caused a lot of fatalities and injuries to 
seafarers, most in maintenance, survey or drilling. Seafarers’ confidence of lifeboats 
was seriously reduced.  
In this report, a coding structure is proposed after analyzing several lifeboat 
accidents by using one primary method called Events and Causal Factor Charting 
(ECFC) and an assisting method called Influence Diagrams. Further, the probabilistic 
model is proposed by utilizing the Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) to help build a 
model for analyzing the relationship between different causal events (variables). A 
human and organizational factors analysis is carried out after the BBN approach. A 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is proposed in that 
chapter. 
A specific coding structure for lifeboat accidents is addressed in the research. This 
could help collecting lifeboat accident data in a more professional way and provide 
the sounding data support for the future quantification work. The BBN and HFACS 
work was proved to be feasible and beneficial for the analysis of lifeboat accidents. 
Future technical analysis could be provided based on the research.  
Key Words: Lifeboat, Influence Diagram, Coding, BBN, HFACS 
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CHAPTER1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
It is common knowledge that humans are difficult to survive after an accident at sea. In 
order to reduce and control the risk of human losses under the acceptable criteria, 
measures and improvements have been taking all the time. Under the requirement that 
lifesaving appliances should be available for everyone on board a vessel, there are also 
improved design of lifeboats and their launching system. With the appliance of the 
lifesaving appliances, the risk of life loss should therefore be reduced.  
 
The application of lifeboats and the corresponding regulations proposed by IMO or the 
local authorities mean that the lifeboats should be maintained under a high standard 
which needs skilled seafarers in practicing and real operation. Thereby, the risk of 
accident occurring during drilling or escaping increases. There are significantly a 
number of lifeboat accidents happened involving lifeboats, davits, winches, hooks and 
other apparatuses. Most of the accidents will result in injuries and some will cause loss 
of life. There have been lifeboat accident reports done by several marine safety branches 
in different countries. Because investigation reports vary from country to country, the 
difference of accident causes emerged. Some accidents were fully investigated due to the 
life loss and thus root causes were clear, while many others were less serious and they 
only identified the immediate causes.  
1.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND LIMITATION  
The lifeboat accidents here are regarded as lifesaving appliance accidents. In most 
conditions, it is the lifeboat system accidents including the lifeboat and the launching 
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system of the lifeboat. Basically, the accidents mentioned in this thesis are lifeboat and 
its launching system accidents. 
The main limitations of this thesis are constraints of accident data resources. Referring 
to a number of lifeboat accidents happened in different countries, it is impossible to find 
them all. Therefore, the analysis is only based on two or three marine accident databases. 
The regional limitation is yet unknown. 
1.3 AIM AND SCOPE 
1.3.1 AIM 
This thesis aims at studying the lifeboat accidents and coding and evaluating risks of 
lifeboat accidents. 
1.3.2 SCOPE 
The objective of this thesis is to study the main causes of lifeboat accidents, to code the 
accidents from technical and operational aspects and then to apply Bayesian Network 
models in risk investigation of lifeboat accidents. The modeling approach is initiated 
from the study of several lifeboat accidents with the goal of identifying causal factors. 
The second step will be the construction of the Influence Diagrams indicating the 
interaction of different causal factors.  Judging from the causal factors as well as accident 
types and miscellaneous aspects, build a coding structure for lifeboat accidents. The final 
step is to build BBN by using conditional probability tables which are based on the 
elicitation of influence diagrams.  
The scope is explicitly divided into the following parts. 
Case study of lifeboat accidents 
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Briefly describe the accidents needed to be analyzed. Lifeboat accident study should be 
started by categorizing work.  Generalize the accident types as well as their causes.  
Draw influence diagrams of each accident to establish a better insight and presentation 
into the accidents. 
Based on the cases analyzed above, establish the influence diagrams of each case. Some 
basic scopes should be reached including the clear structure of influence diagrams, the 
root causes, external causes and the functions that link the cause and consequence. See if 
it is possible to establish a generalized influence diagram to be applied to the analysis of 
lifeboat accidents.  
Study the effect of human factors on conditions of training and real situation. 
Develop a proposal for the coding structure of lifeboat accidents both in technical and 
operational aspect. 
It should be noticed that the importance of coding lifeboat accidents should be studied. 
Make comparisons between the coded accidents and free-text reported accidents. 
Propose a coding structure for the accidents regarding to the technical and operational 
aspects.  
Apply Bayesian Network approaches to support and evaluate the analysis. 
Give a short description of Bayesian Network including its advantages by using BN to 
analyze data. See if there is any relationship between Bayesian Network and Influence 
Diagram in this study. Identify the variables of the accidents, structure BN, elicit 
numbers and calculate conditional probabilities if possible. Judge the possibility of 
finding the probability distribution. 
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1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides the literature study of previous 
studies had been done relating to the scopes mentioned above and the basic definitions 
of concepts and methods used in the thesis. Chapter 3 studies the lifeboat accidents. 
Chapter 4 describes the influence diagram applied to the accident analysis. Chapter 5 
solves the coding scheme on the lifeboat accidents. Chapter 6 provides Bayesian 
Network analysis on the lifeboat accidents. Chapter 7 proposes an analysis and 
classification structure of human factors. Chapter 8 gives the discussion of the work 
done in previous chapters. All supporting details can be found in the appendix.  
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CHAPTER2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to look for a salvation after the ship no longer to be able to secure the seafarers 
and/or passengers’ lives, lifeboats or life rafts shall be considered as the first mean of 
escaping danger and be used under most circumstances. Compared to the application of 
lifeboats on larger ships, the scale limitation makes life rafts possible on smaller ships 
such as leisure boats. As one of the major ways to escape an accident, the safety of 
lifesaving appliances should be promised. However, as mentioned in the above chapter, 
there were unacceptable number of accidents reported involving lifeboat and its 
launching system accidents. Some of them even caused injuries and deaths to the 
seafarers. Accident investigations were carried out and some of the recommendations 
were submitted to International Maritime Organization (IMO) by different countries. In 
the report published by MAIB in 2001, evidence indicated that there were significantly 
number of accidents occurred under training and maintenance1. The IMO has indicated 
categories of accidents most likely to happen which are launching system failure and 
human errors2. From the technical part, newly designed launching systems were 
developed to make the launching and recovering work safer after the lessons of serious 
injuries and deaths3. Some investigations were made to examine the safe launching and 
recovering of lifeboats4 and the application of new control systems in governing the 
descent speed of a seafaring vessel5. In order to reduce human losses, scale models and 
computer simulations were employed to reduce the costs and provide variable results. 
However, this raised another problem indicating human factors. Predicting the effects of 
human factors in the simulation still remains to be evaluated.  Human errors are often 
cited as the major cause of accidents in a significant number of investigation reports. 
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Due to the unacceptable number of lifeboat accidents with crews’ injury and sometimes 
fatality during drills and/or inspections, IMO proposed several regulations relating 
lifeboat accidents, lifeboat design, operation and maintenance to reduce the risk of 
lifeboat accidents. To evacuate passengers from large passenger vessels which are built 
for 5,000 or more people is considered time consuming and lack of deck space. 
Designing of state-of-art lifeboats and marine evacuation systems (MES) has never 
stopped. Norsafe has developed a new free fall principle lifeboat called Rescube which 
can make spontaneous evacuation from several decks possible and quick (See Figure1).  
Figure 1 Rescube Lifeboat 
 
Source: Norsafe AS 
In the first section of the body structure, some definitions and working mechanism of 
lifeboat and its launching system are defined. The following sections will describe the 
researches previously done which relates the current research. The summary part 
summarizes the major projects described in the body structure. Analyses including the 
state-of-the-art, similarities/differences and strengths/weaknesses of literature are 
presented.  
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2.2 BODY STRUCTURE 
2.2.1 BASIC KNOWLEDGE 
A lifeboat of which can be rigid or inflatable may be referred as a small watercraft 
carried on a ship to evacuation in the event of a disaster aboard the ship6.  
The inflatable lifeboat can also be treated as a life raft which is used on commercial 
vessels as the lifeboat does. The life rafts should allow automatic inflation by means of 
the stored high-pressure gas in a short time. SOLAS requires the life rafts to be sealed 
which means it should not be opened until there is an evacuation or inspection.  
The main difference between lifeboats with life rafts is that the former is usually 
equipped propulsion system and can sail on its own power. A modern lifeboat is usually 
equipped an enclosed cover as protection of sun, rain, winds and waves.  
 Basically, there are two types of lifeboats categorized by its launching system. One is 
free-fall lifeboat and the other is normal lowering lifeboat.  The free-fall lifeboat stored 
on a sloping slipway is able to be launched quickly by a quick release mechanism into 
water by free-fall gravity. It is designed to withstand the impact of water when entering 
the sea from a high place. The normal lowering lifeboat is lowered into water with the 
help of davits and winches. However, this requires more launching time than the free-
fall lifeboats. Due to the specialty of the free-fall launching system, the lifeboat is only 
able to return with the help of the large crane. Figure2 shows a typical free-fall lifeboat 
installed on a ship. 
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Figure2. A Typical Free-fall Lifeboat 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:CCNI_Magallanes_mg_5885.jpg 
 
The other type can be lowered to water with release gears. There is regulation stating 
that lifeboat with full loads should be able to disengage from davit lines when it reaches 
or above the water. Some interlocking parts with hooks are attached to the lifeboat 
which allows the lifeboat to pivot and release under rotation7. The complicated design 
will consequently require an extensive training before seafarers can operate it.  Since it 
is reversible, training, maintenance and repair are able to be carried out. Figure3 shows 
the picture of a normal lowering lifeboat. 
Figure3. A Typical Normal Lowering Lifeboat 
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Source: http://www.offshore-
technology.com/contractors/safety/norsafe/norsafe2.html 
 
2.2.2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Joint Industry Survey: Lifeboat Incident Survey-2000 
 A joint industry survey was carried out by OCIME, INTERTANKO and SIGTTO in 20008. 
There was a similar survey Results of a Survey into Lifeboat Safety done in 1994 by 
OCIMF and ICS highlighting equipment issues and availability on approximate technical 
information and documentation on board9. The subsequent survey was carried out 
under the continued lifeboat incidents. Several findings were listed after 89 returned 
completed questionnaires. Totally enclosed lifeboats with onboard release showed the 
majority 75% total incidents. The survey found that all incidents happened during 
maintenance (32%), emergency drill/exercise (35%) and survey (8%). It should be 
pointed that there were no lifeboat incidents or accidents happened under emergency 
situation. Primary causes of minor, serious and non-serious incidents are shown in 
Figure4.  
Figure4: Survey Results of Primary Incident Causes 
 
Injuries caused by equipment failure accounted for 50% while the other half human 
errors and design, operation inherent defect. In the report, surveys showed that there 
were little changes in incident types compared to the report of 1994. However, there 
0 %
5 %
10 %
15 %
20 %
Minor incidents
Major incidents
Non-serious
incidents
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were no fatalities reported in the report which was attributed to the awareness of the 
risks inherent with lifeboat operations by seafarers. The survey also showed the design 
and construction of lifeboats and their auxiliary equipment played significant roles in 
incidents of lifeboats. 
MAIB: Review of Lifeboat and Launching Systems’ Accidents, 2001  
In 2001, Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) published a report regarding 
lifeboat and launching systems’ accidents10. In the report, the general failures happened 
on lifeboat and launching system and the related causal factors were proposed. Some 
recommendations were made. Of 12 professional seafarers or 16% of the total lives lost 
on merchant ships and 87 people injured of a decade period were accounted by MAIB. 
All the accidents happened during training or testing with trained seafarers.  The safety 
study also indicated that the lifeboat launching systems existed deficiencies causing 
injuries or deaths since significant accidents happened when embarking and recovering 
the lifeboat and subsequently lack of confidence of seafarers when doing operations. 
Except for redesigning lifeboat launching systems, maintenance of lifeboat systems, the 
training standards of seafarers are also proposed to reduce risks of lifeboat accidents.  
Since MAIB only accounted lifeboat accidents happened in UK territorial waters, the 
study cannot reflect the true scale of lifeboat accidents worldwide. Recommended 
studies of value, need and desirability of lifeboats as well as the reported incidents and 
accidents worldwide with regard to the specification of lifeboat launching systems to the 
IMO are therefore proposed by MAIB.  
It should also be noticed that the Australian Maritime Services Board (MSB) also 
submitted a study of 9 lifeboat accidents involving lifeboats and design, maintenance 
and equipment deficiencies happened in 7 years to the IMO in 199911. 
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Trevor W Ross: Ship’s Lifeboats: Analysis of Accident Cause and Effect and its 
Relationship to Seafarer’s Hazard Perception 
The project used questionnaires from seafarers as primary data and secondary data of 
lifeboat accidents from marine investigation departments to test 3 proposed 
hypotheses12. Hypothesis one supposed that a correlation exists between lifeboat design 
as an established accident cause and the severity of injuries occurring. To testify this 
hypothesis, the author combined cause with a severity analysis for the first time. Data 
collected showed that no confident conclusion can be drawn even if design was 
responsible for some incidents. Strategies must address maintenance, training and design 
collectively, rather than treating them as individual issues. Hypothesis two addressed 
seafarers’ perceptions of the hazards presented by lifeboats, and their associated systems, 
will be graded in the same order as those apparent from incident reports. Results showed 
that this hypothesis was regarded as unproven because the hypothesis seemed true for 
operational hazards whereas untrue for component hazards. Besides, seafarers would 
sense more hazards even than they actually were. The third hypothesis showed the 
perception of seafarers’ will be that ship’s lifeboats, and their associated systems, are fit for 
purpose. In the report, the majority seafarers revealed positively to lifeboats and the 
author thereby considered hypothesis to be proven.  
Miscellaneous IMO Reports 
The IMO Maritime Safety Committee has approved MSC.1/Circ.120613 at its 81st session 
in 2006 to give recommendations on preventing lifeboat accidents suspending previous 
accepted reports MSC/Circ.104914, MSC/Circ.109315, MSC/Circ.113616 and 
MSC/Circ.113717.   
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2.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The majority of the above reports were done around 2000. Judging by the reports 
described above, evidence shows that they are basically focusing on the causal factors of 
lifeboat accidents and subsequently the improvement measures from lessons learned. 
These reports were strongly regional. Most of them as well as accident investigations 
were done by UK. Consequently the deviations with other countries are yet unknown. In 
the various reports, some basic accident classifications were done and causal factors 
were analyzed in details. Hence, some information in the previous studies is able to be 
applied to the thesis. The present lifeboat accident level is still unknown due to limited 
sources of marine casualties and incidents data. Although appeals of reducing lifeboat 
accidents stopped showing up after the MSC.1/Circ.1206 in 2006, it is still able to see 
lifeboat accidents involving casualties and injuries after that with initial causes of 
technical failure and human error from GISIS. There is a 3 years gap between the last 
investigations on lifeboat accidents and the current status with lifeboat accidents kept 
happening especially 3 GISIS reported accidents in 2007. Particularly, seeing through 
the report of Mr. T. W. Ross, a lot of uncertainties will be found which sourced from the 
questionnaire and hypotheses. In the risk assessment of an accident, data and 
information should be as complete as possible to perform an accurate analysis. As we 
know, owing to the inherent imperfect accident analysis, data and information will be 
uncertain more or less. Modeling assessments by applying probabilistic measures would 
be beneficial to get more reliable results. In the view of this, performing an intuitive 
visual format such as an intuitive visual format such as Influence Diagram and 
succeeding a Bayesian Network which is more and more popular in analyzing marine 
accidents could be significant and state-of-the-art. 
 
13 
 
CHAPTER3 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
3.1 SELECTION OF ACCIDENTS AND INVESTIGATION METHODS 
The important role that accident investigation plays is to establish a better 
understanding of accident description, the root causes of accident and the risk reduction 
measures to prevent or reduce the similar accident from happening 18. It can be seen 
that there are many different accident models and subsequently various accident 
investigation methods in application. Subsequently, the results will be different if 
different investigation methods are used.  
There might be different sources to get the text description of lifeboat accidents. In 
order to subjectively study the causes of lifeboat accidents, the selection of accidents will 
be based on the investigation reports published by the local authorities. Due to the 
limitation of describing a significant number of accidents, there will be 3 accidents 
analyzed in this chapter and the next chapter which represent typical causes of 
accidents such as maintenance factor, human error, design defect, etc.  
This chapter will focus on some lifeboat accidents and apply the primary accident 
investigation method Events and causal factors charting (ECFC) to the analysis of these 
accidents 19. The secondary accident investigation method is addressed in the next 
chapter by using Influence Diagram as a complementary accident investigation method 
to show a better understanding of the accidents. The following table shows the two 
accident investigation methods are supplementary and subsequently can be used to give 
a better illustration of the accident analysis.  
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Table1 Characteristics of the Two Accident Investigation Methods 
Method 
Accident 
Sequenc
e 
Focus 
on 
Safety 
Barrier
s 
Levels 
of 
Analysi
s 
Acciden
t Model 
Primary/Secondar
y 
Analytical 
Approach 
Training 
Need 
Events and 
causal factors 
charting 
Yes No  1-4 B 
Primary 
Non-system 
oriented Novice 
    
 
  Influence 
diagram No Yes   1-6 B/E 
Secondary Non-system 
oriented 
Specialis
t 
 
Experience shows that there are minor accidents resulted from one cause. The majority 
accidents were caused by multiple factors that would interact. Events and causal factors 
charting graphically displays the accident in chronological sequences. It is primarily 
used for assembling the evidence to portray the accident sequence. The accident is 
depicted through the primary events sequence, the secondary events sequence and 
conditions influencing the events. The primary events sequence causing the accident is 
drawn horizontally and chronologically whereas the secondary events are added to the 
events and causal factors when appropriate. Conditions that will affect the events are 
placed above or below the events. The basic frame of the Events and Causal Factors 
Charting is illustrated in Figure 5. 
In this investigation method, the causal factor is also defined and subdivided into 3 
categories which are separately direct cause, contributing cause and root cause.  
Contributing Cause: An event or condition that collectively with other causes increases 
the likelihood of an accident but which individually did not cause the accident. (DOE, 
1997) 
Direct Cause: The immediate events or conditions that caused the accident. (DOE, 1997) 
Root Cause: The causal factor(s) that, if corrected, would prevent recurrence of the 
accident. (DOE, 1997) 
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Figure 5: Events and Causal Factors Charting 
Event Chain
Causal 
Factor
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Condition
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Event Event Event Event
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Why did this event 
happen?
 
 
3.2 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS 
There will be Events and Causal Factors Charting analysis of 3 typical lifeboat accidents 
in this section. The detailed text description of accidents is presented in the appendix 1. 
3.2.1 LIFEBOAT ACCIDENT AND FATALITIES OF HONG KONG REGISTERED BULK 
CARRIER LOWLANDS GRACE 
For this accident, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has already published 
an independent investigation into the accident with an ECFC. A modified one is shown in 
Figure 6.  
As addressed in the chart, it is possible to find that the root cause is the maintenance and 
survey regimes deficiency which caused the ignorance of keel stay conditions and 
subsequently keel stays severely corroded. It is also mentioned in the Recommendation 
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part of the investigation report that maintenance and survey regimes should thoroughly 
inspect and monitor the keel connection condition for lifeboat hooks.  
Obviously, the failure of the aft hook keel stays due to severe corrosion directly caused 
the release of the lifeboat stern and the succeeding forward hook open which released 
the lifeboat thoroughly. This should be treated as the direct cause. After the aft hook keel 
stays failed, there are two contributing factors accelerated the release of the forward 
hook, the design of hook locking mechanism makes partially tripped toward hook prone 
to spontaneous release and the suspension ring acts as a lever increasing the opening 
load on the forward hook mechanism. It is also indicated in the Recommendation part 
that the design company should review the design of their on-load release system in 
light of the Lowlands Grace accident. 
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Figure 6 Lowlands Grace’s Events and Causal Factor Chart 
At 1500 of 7th,Oct 2004, 
crews of ship Lowland Grace  
are mustered to the port 
lifeboat for a boat drill.
At 1520,third mate and 3 
other crews board the 
lifeboat for the drill. 
Crews fasten seat belts 
and wear hard hats and 
lifejackets.
Third mate starts lowering 
by using remote davit winch 
release cable inside boat.
Third mate halts lowering 
when lifeboat is 2-3m 
below boat deck level.
The aft hook’s keel 
stays attaching to the 
keel block fail and lead to 
the release of the boat 
stern.
Deficiencies in 
maintenance and survey 
regimes of lifeboat on-load 
release system.
Condition of keel stays is not 
detected during routine 
maintenance or at surveys
Port lifeboat’s aft hook 
keel stays severely 
corroded
Lifeboat stops with 
a jerk
Lifeboat swings and 
rotates around the 
remaining forward fall 
with stern falling.
Foredeck fails when boat is 
approximately vertical 
damaging the operating 
cable for forward hook and 
partially tripping the hook 
locking mechanism
Lifeboat continues to 
swing and rotate 
subjecting the forward 
hook to large dynamic 
opening loads
Suspension ring acts as a lever 
increasing the opening load on 
the forward hook mechanism
Design of hook locking 
mechanism makes partially 
tripped forward hook prone to 
spontaneous release
Approx 1525, lifeboat 
rotates to approx 220 
degree and forward hook 
opens and releases the 
inverted boat to water, 
injuring all personnel.
Crew lower gangway to 
assist boat crew, master 
notifies port control who 
contacts HMAS 
Melbourne.
Ordinary seaman is 
trapped in capsized boat.
Crews are rescued by 
HMAS Melbourne
Two crews are dead 
and three are 
treated for injuries.
Event Condition Incident
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3.2.2LIFEBOAT ACCIDENT AND INJURY TO CREW ABOARD THE PANAMA FLAG BULK 
CARRIER CAPE KESTREL  
Regarding this incident, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau published the 
investigation report including the ECFC analysis. A modified ECFC is presented in Figure 
7 in the following. 
Judging from the investigation report, there are several factors contributing to the 
incident. It can be regarded as human errors which result in the incident. Because of the 
partition of the forward falls and following the aft falls, the lifeboat fell into the sea with 
bow first. That could be regarded as the direct cause.  
The following described can be addressed as the contributing factors: 
With the hoist button on the winch remote control unit not operating and the fault that 
resulted in this not identified and rectified, the boat was hoisted manually by pushing in 
the winch motor contactor in the starter panel which located in the air conditioning 
room. 
For the first engineer in the air conditioning room, the noise hampered him from 
communicating with the mate. He was also unable to see the boat station from that 
position.  
For the mate who ignored the instructions of the master that crews should disembark at 
the main deck, he also was not aware of how the boat was being hoisted and the 
consequence of manually using the contactor to hoist the boat. The consequence turned 
out to bypass safety systems.  
Probably, the clutch lever was not in the correct position for turning the boat in and as a 
result, the boat came in too fast. 
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For the 1st engineer and the chief engineer, both of them should have known that it was 
obligatory that hoisting of the boat should cease before contact was made with the limit 
switches on the frame of the davits. The boat should have been turned in manually after 
exceeding the threshold. The first engineer seemed not aware of the fact that the limit 
switches had been bypassed. The chief engineer did not notice him as well.  
The above can be treated as the root causes of the accident. If the engineers were aware 
of the operation regulations, the accident would have been prevented.  
 Attentions to the operation hazard while operating the winch with the contactor should 
be drawn and warning notices should be posted. All the documentations and all 
personnel training for maintenance, inspection and adjustment of lifeboats, launching 
appliances and associated equipment should be in accordance with relevant ISM codes. 
Self-launching cradle stoppers are recommended for manufacturers for the purpose of 
preventing the davits dropping under the circumstance of broken fall wires. 
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Figure7 Cape Kestrel Events and Causal factor Chart 
Ship anchored and 
port boat with mate 
and 4 crews is 
lowered to the sea
12 Oct. Master 
decides to lower port 
lifeboat to conduct a 
drill
AB on deck operates 
remote control to 
recover the boat.
Boat finishes testing 
and falls re-engaged.
Control fails to operate 
winch motor. AB 
informs 1st engineer 
the problem.
1st engineer resets 
the circuit breaker 
in the starter panel 
after it has tripped.
After The circuit breaker trips again, 
the 1st engineer informs the mate 
that the boat will be lifted manually. 
AB starts winding the boat.
1st engineer attempts 
to locate problem with 
remote control. Manual 
recovery is stopped.
Boat is coming up 
slowly.
1st engineer pushes in 
contactor, operating hoist 
motor. The circuit breaker 
does not trip. 
1st engineer notices 
the mate he will 
hoist the boat fro 
the starter panel.
Master tells the 
mate to disembark 
at the main deck.
1st engineer stops 
hoisting when boat 
reaching main deck.
Master instructs 
mate to use tackles 
to bowse boat into 
shipside.
Boat is too far from 
main deck to 
disembark.
Mate tells 1st 
engineer to resume 
hoisting.
1st engineer hoists boat 
by using contactor in the 
starter panel, despite 
master protesting.
Limit switches do not 
work. Davits reach stops 
with winch running and 
forward falls part.
Mate expects limit 
switches to operate
Bow drops and after 
falls part. Davits 
drop forward, 
releasing boat.
At 0930, boat with 
crews falls about 
20 meters into sea.
Damaged lifeboat is 
recovered after new falls 
were fitted.
Injured crews are 
taken to hospital by 
helicopter.
Event
Condition
Incident
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3.2.3LIFEBOAT ACCIDENT AND INJURY TO CREW ABOARD THE FRENCH REGISTERED 
ANTARCTIC SUPPORT VESSEL L’ASTROLABE 
Based on the investigation report published by ATSB, a modified ECFC is presented in 
Figure 8. 
It is pointed out in the report that there is no hand holds attached to either in the fall 
block or the suspension ring which means that the crew in the lifeboat had to handle the 
blocks and rings directly by manhandle. It also indicated that the lifeboats on the ship 
were not required to equip foul weather recovery strops which, with the presence, could 
have prevented the danger of swinging fall blocks to the lifeboat crew. The above, on the 
other hand, can be treated as the root causes. If either above described was fitted, it 
could have prevented or at least reduced the risk of the accident. The direct cause of the 
accident can therefore be considered as the second engineer caught his thumb while 
attempting to secure the aft fall. The contributing causes are listed below: 
There was no painter left to be attached to the forward fall block after the boat departed 
to rescue the 4-8 crew member. 
The vessel motion in the seaway made it difficult to recover the lifeboat and caused 
damage to the lifeboat and its fittings. 
Some recommendations were made to reduce the risk of this kind of accident. It includes 
the follows: 
For totally enclosed lifeboats, it should be considered to replace suspension rings 
attached to the lifeboat’s fall blocks with preferably designed rings attached with ‘hand 
holds’  
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The foul weather recovery strops should be considered to be provided. It also suggested 
the Flag State should refer it to the International Maritime Organization for 
consideration. 
Figure 8 L’Astrolabe Lifeboat Events and Causal Factor Chart 
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CHAPTER 4 INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS ON LIFEBOAT ACCIDENTS 
In this chapter, the influence diagrams will be applied to the accidents analyzed in last 
chapter. The purpose is to find out the how the causal factors interact with each other. 
Based on the influence diagrams, judge the influence of human factors contributing to 
the accident causal factors.  
4.1 DEFINITION OF INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS 
An influence diagram is a simple graphical and mathematical representation of a 
decision problem. It is considered as a model which combines Bayesian networks and 
decision making problems in fixed orders. 
An ID is a directed acyclic graph consisting of nodes and arcs. In order to simplify the 
drawing workload, the software Microsoft VISIO is used to construct the IDs. The 
following illustrates the definitions and sketches of the basic components.  
Nodes:  
Decision: A decision is a variable drawn as a rectangle that is able to be       controlled by 
a decision maker.  
Chance: A chance variable is drawn as an oval which means uncertainty and unable to be 
controlled manually.  
Objective: An objective variable is represented by a hexagon indicating the criterion that 
a decision maker is trying to maximize or minimize.  
General: A general variable is a deterministic function of quantities it depends on. It is 
drawn as a rounded rectangle. Typically, it is usually used to represent a deterministic 
quality or functional relationship.  
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Arcs:   An arrow or arc denotes the influence which expresses knowledge about       
relevance. It does not necessarily represent a causal relation or a flow of material, data 
or money.  
4.2 CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS 
In order to build the specific ID for each accident, a basic understanding of how the 
accidents are categorized is essential. This section aims at the construction of the 
generalized influence diagram and the provision of evidence for the building of Bayesian 
Belief Network (BBN) in the final chapter.  
Before starting, there are a few considerations needing to be noticed: 
There is no such model that was built before. The causal factors for the lifeboat accidents 
are miscellaneous and therefore difficult to be modeled totally. Based on the risk 
influence model developed by SINTEF Industrial Management for North-sea helicopter 
transport 20, a modified model is developed in the following.   
There will be two IDs which are consisted of frequency of incidents/accidents (I/A) and 
consequence of I/A.  
There are three levels of risk influencing factors (RIFs) in the frequency influencing 
diagram described in the report mentioned above: operational, organizational and 
regulatory & customer related. It is considered the same case as in the marine industry 
and thus can be applied to the modeling of the generalized ID of frequency.  They are 
also applicable for the structure of the consequence ID.  
Generalized influence diagrams are built as shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10. For the 
frequency ID, as can be judged from the above, the objective variable is lifeboat accident 
frequency. The decision variables are represented by the technical dependability, the 
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operational dependability and the external environment which are augmented with the 
chance variables such as design, operation procedure, sea, etc.  
Accordingly, the accidents investigated in the former chapter will be developed based on 
the generalized ID.  
Figure9. Generalized Influence Diagram in Frequency of Lifeboat Accidents 
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Figure10. Generalized Influence Diagram in Consequence of Lifeboat Accidents 
 
4.3 SPECIFIC DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
There are some definitions that have appeared several times in various reports or 
regulations. Due to the above reason, the following only lists the definitions needing 
explanation.  
4.3.1 VARIABLES IN FREQUENCY ID 
Decision Variables: 
Operations Working Conditions: Factors consisting of physical working conditions 
and organizational working conditions that influence the crew’s ability to perform the 
required tasks.  
Operations Procedures: Procedures covering all aspects with releasing and recovering 
of a lifeboat required by SOLAS and LSA, including the operation manuals of lifeboat and 
its launching system, the checklists, etc. 
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  4.3.2 VARIABLES IN CONSEQUENCE ID 
Equipment and Structural Integrity at Sea: No significant damage to hull and 
equipment and being able to perform the function of life-saving appliance after 
contacting with sea and/or subsequent operations at sea.  
4.4 INFLUENCE DIAGRAM FOR EACH ACCIDENT 
Based on the above frequency and consequence IDs generalized for the lifeboat 
accidents, specific analysis for each accident in last chapter is presented in the following 
figures (Figure11-Figure16).  
4.4.1 FREQUENCY AND CONSEQUENCE IDS FOR LOWLANDS GRACE ACCIDENT 
As indicated in the official investigation report, there is recommendation to the 
manufacturer suggesting the redesign of the on-load release system in view of the 
Lowlands Grace accident and other incidents involving on-load release systems of 
similar design. Here, it is treated as existence of design failure. For consideration in 
accordance with the definition of Customer in the ID, ship owners, managers are treated 
as the customer. Recommendations to the statutory authorities, classification societies, 
customer and international organizations are thus treated as the existence of survey and 
maintenance regime deficiencies including the operations procedures. The frequency ID 
is therefore presented in Figure 11. 
As mentioned above, there exist design deficiencies which will result in the reduced 
reliability of on-load release systems of the lifeboat. The lifeboat accident consequence 
mitigation is able to be realized if there are improved design and systems reliability. 
Referring to the crashworthiness, the absorption of impact energy by lifeboat will 
eliminate the energy absorbed by human body and thus provide the first protection 
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layer. The survival equipment enables the further protection of the human body. Here it 
is regarded as the helmet, the lifejackets, etc. When contacting with water by accidental 
release, the ability to maintain structural integrity and normal floating conditions 
provides the seafarers inside the lifeboat probabilities to escape the hazard. The fast 
reactions of the rescue team as well as the first aid provided by the seafarers on board 
are able to reduce the liability of seafarers in the lifeboat from suffering further harms. 
Obviously, in this accident, the lifeboat capsized accompanied with structural failure and 
thus caused the deaths and injuries to the seafarers inside the boat. Figure 12 
represented the consequence ID for this accident. 
Figure11. The Frequency ID for Lowlands Grace Accident 
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Figure12. The Consequence ID for Lowlands Grace Accident 
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4.4.2 FREQUENCY AND CONSEQUENCE IDS FOR CAPE KESTREL 
Accident recommendations indicated several aspects with respect to the technical and 
operational aspects. From the technical review, the training and the maintenance and 
survey are requested to be executed strictly under several regulations. It can be 
interpreted as the technical deficiencies in ship owners and operators from one hand. 
From the other, it also indicates that the operations working conditions, the operations 
procedures and the human behavior are not satisfactory under the very scenario. It is 
able to be improved by following the regulations/rules strictly and thus reduce the risk 
of operational factors. 
For the lifeboat manufacturers, there is maintenance recommendation by fitting another 
equipment to prevent the same accident. See Figure 13 for the frequency ID. 
In this accident, the improved system design, referred as the fitting of self-launching 
cradle stoppers, could improve the system reliability and prevent the davits from 
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dropping and subsequently prevent the lifeboat accident. There are reports of glass 
broken at the front hatch and causing water inlet. The water inlet stopped when the bow 
rose. Personnel wearing protecting equipment suffered injuries only. It can be 
comprehended that the energy were absorbed by lifeboat and the protecting equipment 
which substantially reduced the amount of energy absorption for humans. However, if 
we review the accident, the crew competence such as the communication, the 
training…is insufficient. This could possibly cause a more severe accident if the lifeboat 
hardware system was relatively weak. The immediate response of ship crews as well as 
local rescue services reduced the subsequent risks when boat crews suffering injuries at 
sea. See Figure 14 for the consequence ID. 
 
Figure13. Frequency ID for Cape Kestrel Accident 
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Figure14. Consequence ID for Cape Kestrel Accident 
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4.4.3 FREQUENCY AND CONSEQUENCE IDS FOR L’ASTROLABE 
As can be seen from the analysis of last chapter, the inadequate design of suspension 
rings attached to the lifeboats’ fall blocks caused the injury to the second engineer’s 
right hand. In the recommendations due to this accident, a suitable design of suspension 
rings with ‘hand holds’ attached was proposed.  
This could be attributed to the chance variable Design for manufacturers. The 
replacement of newly designed rings as well as another suggestion of providing foul 
weather recovery strops could be treated as Maintenance. It should be pointed out that 
the injury to the second engineer and his subsequent actions could possibly cause fear 
or psychological unstable to the remaining seafarers on board and thus elongate the 
recovery operation or cause further incidents. Thus, this is regarded as Human factors 
variable. In this accident, the swell introduced the difficulty in recovery operation. If the 
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sea state is good enough, the risk of accident could be eliminated. The frequency ID is 
shown in Figure 15. 
From the view of mitigating consequences, the proper design could significantly 
eliminate the consequence of injury. In case of the crews knowing the hazard when 
operating and the emergency procedures including the instruction of operation and 
rescue under hostile environment, the second engineer could have been able to avoid 
the injury. It is therefore added here. The report pointed out the recovery of lifeboat 
took about 70 minutes. This could possibly cause the added insult to injury. Therefore, it 
could be significant if the recovery is faster. Accordingly, the mastering environment 
variable is added here. See Figure 16. 
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Figure15. Frequency ID for L’Astrolabe Accident 
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Figure16. Consequence ID for L’Astrolabe Accident 
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CHAPTER5 CODING STRUCTURE OF LIFEBOAT ACCIDENTS 
This chapter will develop a coding structure for lifeboat accidents relating technical and 
operational aspects. Section 1 will introduce the basic procedures of building an 
accident database. Section 2 and 3 will develop a coding structure for lifeboat accidents. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION TO ACCIDENT DATA CODING 
Kjellén mentioned in his book ‘Prevention of Accidents through Experience Feedback’21 
that two important aspects separately Data Type and Data Elements must be specified in 
defining an accident database. For data elements, it can be regarded as types of facts 
included in each accident including date, place, etc. Data type can be treated as the way 
data is coded, for instance, nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio scale or free text. Following 
the decision of accident model selection based on the information quality and quantity 
as well as the efforts on investigation and result quality assurance, an accident database 
could be established.  
 Data with nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio scale here could be treated as the coded 
data. By searching for events meeting the criteria in ordinal, interval or ratio scale, it 
basically means to search accidents during a time scale or period. For example, to find 
lifeboat accidents happened in 2009 or injured person absent for more than 30 days. 
The nominal measurement means accidents under a specific condition such as accidents 
during maintenance. The coded data will enable the analysis of data in a structured and 
statistical way such as tables and diagrams, etc.  
Free text descriptions will be used when matching certain words. For instance, match 
causal factors with design deficiency. The free text descriptions are unstructured and 
unsuitable for quantitative analysis. However, it promises the richness of data.  
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5.2 LIFEBOAT ACCIDENT CODING 
In MAIB’s investigation report on the lifeboat accidents, lifeboat accidents were blamed 
to be the major causes of deaths.  Although several countries have realized this problem 
and several rules and regulations were also made to improve the lifeboat safety, there is 
still no systematic and generalized coding structure to record lifeboat accidents. A 
lifeboat accident coding structure is therefore needed to be proposed to show what 
happened and why it happened and furthermore, to provide the sound proof of 
improving the lifeboat safety.  
Of different accident investigation reports published by different countries, there are 
some common parts which could be used to build the coding structure.  
The introduction to basic ship characteristics and narrative of the accident 
This will make up the basic information part of the coding structure. By entering the 
details to the accident database, search results such as time, place, weather, lifeboat 
details and accident summary can be reached. Especially, the summary part should at 
least contain key aspects such as time, location, task, main failure sequence and the 
subsequent rescue procedure to help the reader get a rough understanding of the accident. 
The accident analysis 
This part constitutes the main body of the coding structure.  The causal factors should be 
therefore listed and classified according by the technical and operational aspect. The 
consequence of the accident is required to be addressed as well.  
The concluding of causal factors and the recommendations to prevent further similar 
accidents  
This part should be regarded as the supplement part of the coding structure to provide 
the recommendations to roles involved in the lifeboat accident. 
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Based on the aspects described above and combing the technical and operational 
consideration, a general proposal for lifeboat accidents is shown in Figure 17 to help to 
code the lifeboat accidents in a quantitative and qualitative way. 
Figure17. General Coding Proposal for Lifeboat Accidents 
Case details
Lifeboat 
Details
What
Winch failure,
Hook failure
When,Where,
Environment
Casualty Rank
Injury category
Causal Factor
How/Why
Premature hook release
Davit Overload
Underlining 
causal factor
Technical 
Operational
Sub factor
Design
Maintenance
Human error
Recommendations
 
Based on the coding proposal, a coding structure for lifeboat accidents is provided in the 
following section. 
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5.3 LIFEBOAT ACCIDENT CODING STRUCTURE 
Table 2: Coding Structure: Basic Information of Accident 
 
Basic Information of Accident 
1 Time of Incident Date: DD/MM/YYYY   
 
  Time: GMT& Local   
2 Location Place Name: Name of port or other geographical reference 
 
  
Longitude: 
  
 
  Latitude:     
3 Environment Wind: Force (Beaufort Scale) 
 
 
 
Wave/Swell: Height 
 
 
  Ice Conditions: Y/N   
   
 
 4 Lifeboat Particulars Type: Boat Code  
  
Length Overall: m  
  
Draught: m  
  
Propulsion: Engine Type, Manufacturer  
  
Built: Yard, Year  
  
Crew: Capacity and Personnel Involved 
 
  
Launch Type: Davit Launch/Free-fall 
 
  
Enclosed Type: Y/N 
 
  
Classification Society: 
  
  
National Authority : 
  
5 Summary 
Free-text description. Should at least contain time, location, task, main failure mode and the subsequent 
rescue procedure. 
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Table 3: Coding Structure: Casualty Data 
Casualty Data 
6 Personnel Involved 
     
  
Result of Incident: Minor, Death, etc. 
  
  
Number: 
    
  
Position: Rank/ Passenger 
  
  
Gender: M/ F 
   
  
Age: 
    
  
Injury/ Missing/ Fatality Nature: Cut, Drown, etc. 
  
  
Part of Body: Leg, Arm, etc. 
  
  
Activities: Survey, Emergency, etc. 
 
    Incident Place: 
Detailed Place of 
Ship/Lifeboat   
7 Failure Mode: Hook Failure, Bowsing failure, etc.       
8 Subsequent events if any: Hull damage due to impact with water, etc.       
9 Lifeboat Condition: Capsized, listing, etc. + Free-text Description 
 
Table 4: Coding Structure: Technical Contributions to Incidents/Accidents 
Technical Contributions to Incidents/Accidents 
    Characters Involved Severity Cause Description Others 
10 Design Operator, Manufacturer, etc. Minor, Major, etc. Free-text description 
Recommendations, Notifications, 
etc. Free-text description 
11 Survey Operator, Manufacturer, etc. Minor, Major, etc. Free-text description 
12 Maintenance Operator, Manufacturer, etc. Minor, Major, etc. Free-text description 
13 Training Operator, Manufacturer, etc. Minor, Major, etc. Free-text description 
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Table 5: Coding Structure: Operational Contributions to Incidents/Accidents 
Operational Contributions to Accidents/Incidents 
    
Personnel 
Involved Type Severity Cause Description Others 
14 Human Violations/Errors 
Crew, Passenger, 
etc. Slip, Lapse, etc. 
Minor, Major, 
etc. 
Free-text 
description 
Recommendation
s, Notifications, 
etc. Free-text 
description 
    Physical 
Psychologica
l Organizational     
15 
Operations Working 
Conditions Illness, etc. Fear, etc. 
Emergency, 
etc. 
Minor, Major, 
etc. 
Free-text 
description 
16 Operations Procedures Manual, checklist, etc. 
Minor, Major, 
etc. 
Free-text 
description 
 
 
Table 6: Coding Structure: Additional Information 
Additional Information  
Sequence of Events leading to Accident Free-text Description 
Actions be taken to Prevent Similar Accidents Free-text Description 
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CHAPTER 6 APPLICATION OF BBN ON LIFEBOAT SAFETY STUDY 
In this chapter, the feasibility of utilizing the Bayesian Belief Network on lifeboat safety 
study will be discussed. The steps are as follows: 
Definition and example of BBN 
Application of BBN on lifeboat accident analysis 
How to assign conditional probability tables 
Modeling of BBN based on a specific case 
6.1 DEFINITION AND EXAMPLE OF BBN 
A Bayesian Belief Network which is also called directed acyclic graphical (DAG) model is 
consisted of a set of nodes and directed edges between nodes.  The nodes here represent 
the probability distribution which might be continuous or discrete and the edges here 
mean the conditional probabilistic dependencies.  A simple BBN is shown below. 
Figure18. A sample of Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) 
X1
X3X2
 
The node which arcs are directed into is often referred to as ‘Child Node’. Likewise, the 
node with arcs depart from is called ‘Parent Node’. In the above figure, the X1 is called 
parent to X2 and X3, and X2, X3 is therefore regarded as the child of X1. Nodes without 
parents are called Root Nodes and nodes without children are called Leaf Nodes. Nodes 
such as X1, X2, and X3 may have more values than true and false and not all relations 
have to be deterministic.  
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Bayesian Belief Network simply represents the qualitative and quantitative information. 
The qualitative part is treated as the whole structure which graphically shows the causal 
relationships of the variables. The quantitative part is treated as various conditioned 
probability distributions of variables.  
To build a BBN, the following steps can be used: 
First, to identify the problem or in other words what I would like to know. For example, 
estimate the probability of user receives the data packets through server 1. Assume the 
data packets can be accepted through server 1 and server 2. Also, suppose server 1 has a 
direct effect on server 2 which can be understood as server 2 will usually not transmit 
data packets when server 1 succeed in transmitting data packets to user. 
A simple framework can be built with the information hypothesized above. In figure 19, 
‘User’ is the hypothesis variable (Child).  ‘Server 1’ and ‘Server 2’ are the information 
variables (Parents). The hypothesis variable is influencing the information variables. On 
the other hand, the information variables are indicating the hypothesis variable. 
Figure19. Example BBN 
User
Server1 Server2
Hypothesis 
Variable
Information 
Variable
 
This step is to assign states for each variable. For simple considerations, a binary state 
indicating the true/false state is assigned to each variable. The following table shows the 
details of different variables. 
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Table7. Binary Condition of Example Variables 
Variable State Meaning 
User T User receives data packets 
 
F User fails to receive data packets 
Server1 
 T Server 1 transmits data packets to user 
 
F Server 1 fails to transmit data packets to user 
Server 2 T Server 2 transmits data packets to user 
  F Server 2 fails to transmit data packets to user 
 
This step is to determine the probabilities for different variables. Considering this as an 
example, the original probabilities for parent variables are all assumed values. An 
original probability table is prepared for the parent variables and a conditional 
probability table is prepared for the child variable. See Figure 20. 
Figure20. Probabilities of the Example BBN 
User
Server 1 Server 2
Server 1
T F
0.4 0.6
Server 1
T
F
FT
0.68 0.32
0.54 0.46
Server 2
Server2Server1
F F
F T
T F
T T
User
T F
0 1
0.8 0.2
0.09 0.91
0.98 0.02
 
Based on the above figure, the probability of sensor commanded fire can be determined.  
%15.414115.0
0)3264.06.068.08.0(01656.021168.0
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This conditional probability table is relatively small due to the fact of only two parent 
variables and all variables with only two states. Considering a real situation such as 
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causal factors to accidents, a huge amount of variables would therefore be added with 
unlimited states.  
6.2 APPLICATION OF BBN IN LIFEBOAT ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
Bayesian Belief Networks are often used to represent uncertainties in a probabilistic 
approach where the qualitative information is usually based on expert judgments. In 
another understanding, the human and organizational factors, for most of the times, are 
better fitted with BBNs because the HOFs are complex and uncertain. Studies on using 
BBNs in modeling the HOFs in maritime accidents were also made22.  
In general understanding, the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a widely used method for 
dependability modeling and evaluation of technical problems. This technique is to 
identify an unwanted/undesired event as a Top Event (TE) and construct a hierarchical 
tree calling Fault Tree (FT) from events to the basic causes. There are some basic 
assumptions on the method: 
Events should be binary, for example, working or not-working. 
Events should be independent which means no interactions between different events.  
Events and the next lower level causes should be connected by means of logical AND/OR 
gates.  
It is not difficult to see that a significant number of accidents happened combined 
technical failure and human interference. Studies of mapping the FT and BBNs have 
shown a new perspective of analyzing such accidents23. In the report ‘On the Use of the 
Hybrid Causal Logic Method in Offshore Risk Analysis’24, a framework which is called HCL 
framework in simple, combining the traditional risk analysis tools such as event trees, 
fault trees as well as BBNs has been developed to provide decision support for 
Norwegian oil and gas industry. Based on this article, a similar analysis can be proposed 
to the lifeboat accidents.  
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The initiating phase is to develop a fault tree/event tree structure for the specific 
accident. Then a decision must be made to decide events which need to be modeled in 
fault trees and further analyzed in details by using BBNs.  
There are six steps presented in the article for adapting the HCL framework for the oil 
and gas industry. 
Define Risk Influence Factors (RIFs) ad causal relationships for the relevant basic events of 
the fault trees. 
The RIFs can be connected to another RIF or a binary event/node. In order to 
systemically combine the human and organizational factors as well as the causal 
relationships, expert judgments are essential.  
Identify concurrent RIFs. 
In this step, it should be noted that concurrent RIFs should be identified to be singular in 
the BBN to be constructed.  
Build a BBN. 
The article recommended that it should look like a wheel with the binary events on the 
outer edge and the structure of RIFs in the inner part.  
Assign the conditional probability tables. 
This method is presented in details in the next section. 
Evaluate performance, and assign one state for (some of) the RIFs. 
For simple consideration, a three state performance is used to replace the six state 
distribution of performance evaluation. See table 8 below. 
Table8. States to Evaluate the RIFs 
State State Characteristics 
1 State is better than reference level 
0 Minimum intended safety level 
-1 State is worse than minimum safety level 
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However, the analysts and decision makers must guarantee that the evaluation and 
assignment process is reliable when assigning the states.  
Calculate the risk results. 
In the report, the authors suggested an approximate approach for the calculation work. 
First, use a suitable software tool such as HUGIN, to model the BBN part. Then input the 
probabilities for binary states which are calculated above to the fault tree/event tree 
software such as Risk Spectrum.  
 
6.3 ASSIGN CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY TABLES 
This section will be divided into two parts which are separately 6.3.1 Conditional 
Probability tables for RIFs and 6.3.2 Conditional Probability tables for binary events.  
6.3.1 CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY TABLES FOR RIFS 
For simple consideration, an example will be used to illustrate how to assign conditional 
probability tables for RIFs. Assume a simple structure such as Figure 21. Also assume all 
the variables have been properly defined and each of them has three states: +1, 0 and -1 
which can be understood through Table 8. Under this condition, we only need to 
calculate 33 conditional probabilities for the child variable. 
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Figure21. A sample BBN for Calculating Conditional Probability Tables 
B C
A
P(B=1) P(B=0) P(B=-1)
0.6 0.3 0.1
P(C=1) P(C=0) P(C=-1)
0.5 0.3 0.2
B C
1 1
1 0
1 -1
0 1
0 0
0 -1
-1
-1
1
0
-1 -1
To be determined
wB wC
 
There are three steps to determine the conditional probability table. 
Step1. Weights Determination of Parent Variables B and C 
This is based on the fact that the probability for a child variable that differs considerably 
from its parents’ states should be small and on the contrary, there will be a greater 
probability for those who have a little or no deviation from its parents’ states. The 
smaller probability should be assigned as well on condition that the greater deviation 
between parents’ states.  
Assume B has a greater effect than C. The importance measurement is based on the 
expert judgment and weighting meaning the sum of weight B and C should be 1. See 
Table 9. 
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Table9. Weights for Parent Variable B and C 
  Factors determined by expert judgment Normalized Weight 
B 80% WB=0.8 
C 20% WC=0.2 
 
Step2. Distance Measurement of Parent Variables and Child Variable 
This step is to calculate the distances from the RIF which in here means A to the parent 
variable B and C. The formula below is used to calculate the distance Zj. 
i
n
i
ijj wZZ ||
1


 ,  6,0jZ  
-Zij here means the distance between the parent state i and the state of the RIF we are 
considering. For example, if we assume j=1, i=1 for B, the absolute value of Zij is |1-1|=0. 
Assume j=1, i=0 for C, the absolute value of Zij is |0-1|=1. 
-n is the number of parents. 
-j is a possible state of the RIF we are considering. In this example, j can be +1, 0 and -1. 
-wi is the weight of parent variable. 
Assume B is in state 1 and C is in state 0, the distance measure for A, Z1, Z0 and Z-1 can be 
determined as follows: 
2.02.018.00|||| 011  CCBB wZwZZ  
8.02.008.01|||| 000  CCBB wZwZZ  
8.12.0|)1(0|8.0|)1(1||||| 111   CCBB wZwZZ  
The rest distance measures from B, C to A is shown in the following table.  
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Table10. Distances from Parent Variable B and C to Child Variable A 
B C Z1 Z0 Z-1 
1 1 0 1 2 
1 0 0.2 0.8 1.8 
1 -1 0.4 1 1.6 
0 1 0.8 0.2 1.2 
0 0 1 0 1 
0 -1 1.2 0.2 0.8 
-1 1 1.6 1 0.4 
-1 0 1.8 0.8 0.2 
-1 -1 2 1 0 
 
Step3. Assign Probabilities for Zj and Calculate Conditional Probability Table 
Different Zj should be assigned different probabilities. The probability distribution is 
determined by the following formula. 
 



f
aj
RZ
RZ
j
j
j
e
e
P , ]1,0[jP  
Here R means the outcome distribution index. Due to the negative sign in the index, it 
can be known that the higher R is, the lower probability the RIF is in a state distant from 
its parents’ states. Here a, f should be considered to be changing from 1 to -1 via 0.  
Still, R is not determined at all. The article assumed R is an intuitive index for experts. 
Based on the article, three default values of R (0,1and 2) is assigned to predict the 
probability distributions. See figure 22 for detailed calculation. It is able to be seen that 
it is a uniform distribution when R=0 and the greater R is, the narrower the probability 
distribution will be. Based on the expert judgment, R=1 will be assigned because it is 
believed to be the best to address the probability distribution of states A. Accordingly, a 
complete conditional probability table of state A is shown in table 11.  
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Figure22. Probability Distribution with 3 Default Values of R 
 
Table11. Conditional Probability Table for State A with R=1 
B C P1 P0 P-1 
1 1 0.67 0.24 0.06 
1 0 0.57 0.28 0.08 
1 -1 0.54 0.23 0.09 
0 1 0.29 0.39 0.13 
0 0 0.21 0.42 0.16 
0 -1 0.19 0.36 0.18 
-1 1 0.16 0.18 0.25 
-1 0 0.12 0.20 0.29 
-1 -1 0.09 0.16 0.33 
It can be seen that with a simple case, a large amount of dataset was constructed. For the 
real situation, analysis software will therefore be used.  
6.3.2 CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY TABLE FOR BINARY STATES 
For this step, the article also proposed three steps for the construction of conditional 
probability table based on the Barrier and Operational Risk Analysis (BORA) method. 
Quantify basis probability. In most cases, it can be determined by using historical data. 
Deterimne by expert judgement maximum deviation from the basis probability. 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
P1 P0 P-1
R=0
R=1
R=2
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In this step, the adjustment factor reflecting the basis probability adjustment when 
parent variables in extreme states (-1 and 1) should be determined. The default state is 
in 0. A table is shown below for the selection of adjustment factors. 
Table12. Adjustment Factors for Basis Probabilities 
Parent RIFs state Adjustment factors Q 
-1 4a 
0 1 
1 0.55 
a-The factors are only valid for basis probabilities p<0.1 
 
Calculate the conditional probability tables. The conditional probability table are 
calculated as follows: 




1
11 k
ikik
n
i
ibasisj QPwPP ]1,0[jP  
Pik are the probabilities for each parent variable i tobe in each state-1, 0 and 1. Qik would 
be the corresponding adjustment factors and wi would be the weights for parents i. The 
index j are the possbile binary states (Failure or Working).  
For example, assume the probability for parent event B is 0.2, 0.6 and 0.2 corresponding 
the state -1, 0 and 1, the probability for parent event C is 0.1, 0.7 and 0.2 corresponding 
the state -1, 0 and 1. The weights for B and C will be the 0.8 and 0.2. It is able to get the 
Pfailure=1.45Pbasis.  
 
6.4 CASE STUDY OF BBN ON LIFEBOAT ACCIDENTS 
In order to simplify the modeling work, a rather simple case ‘Lowlands Grace’ is used in 
this section. The accident analysis can be seen in the previous chapter 3 and 4 to help get 
a better understanding of the accident.  
51 
 
Based on the BORA method, a simple barrier block diagram is presented below. There 
are three barrier blocks to prevent the accident from happening. The first would be the 
maintenance regime for on-load release systems (keel stays are part of the systems). 
The following would be the survey regime for on-load systems. If both of the above fail 
and cause the releasing of lifeboat from one side, a robust design of on-load release 
systems would be able to function and prevent the release of lifeboat.  
Figure23. Block Diagram for Lowlands Grace Lifeboat Accidents 
Initiating 
Event
Barriers 
Functions
End Event
1.Maintenance 
2.Survey
3. On-load 
Release 
Systems Design
Fall of 
lifeboats
Safe/Minor 
Consequence
Keel Stays 
Corroded
 
The following steps will be based on section 6.2. 
The first step is to define the RIFs and fault trees. The fault trees of lifeboat fall due to 
the maintenance and survey deficiencies are modeled in figure 24. It should be noted 
that the on-load release systems design is a basic event and therefore no fault tree for 
this event. The RIFs are defined in figure 25. The second step is to define concurrent 
RIFs. Here, the RIFs having the same description in figure 25 are considered to be 
concurrent. It should be noticed that Time Pressure factor and Time factor is different 
and should not be treated as the same. Based on the previous step a BBN can be built in 
step 3. See figure 26. 
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Figure24. Fault Trees for Barrier function 1 and 2 
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Figure25. Causal Relationship of Initiating Event and Basic Events for Fault Trees 
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condition
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Rules/
Regulations
Deviation
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Survey
Maintenance
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The fourth step will be assigning the conditional probability tables. Here, only one 
example regarding the technician fails to detect the keel stays condition will be shown 
for the purpose of illustration. There will be totally 34=81 probabilities to be modeled if 
only 3 states are considered in this example.  
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Figure26. Bayesian Belief Network for the Specific Case 
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By using the method described above, the weights for parent factors will be firstly 
assigned. See table 13. 
Table13. Weights for the Parent Factor of the RIF Technician ‘Fails to Detect Keel 
Stays Condition’ 
RIF: Technician fails to detect keel stays 
condition 
Factors assigned by expert 
judgment (%) 
Normalized 
weights wi 
R: Rule/Regulation Deviation 50 0.46 
C:Process complexity 30 0.27 
E:Training/Experience of technician 20 0.18 
T:Time pressure 10 0.09 
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Still, assume 3 states are separately -1, 0 and 1. Based on the distance measurement 
formula, the distance to the accident state (-1) can be determined. See appendix 2. 
To determine the outcome distribution index R, expert judgments are needed. A value of 
1 is determined due to the mild distribution curve in figure 22. Since the accidents have 
negative influences, the value of the child variable will be assigned to be -1. The 
conditional probability table is then determined. It can be read in the appendix 3. 
Detailed analysis such as most likely combination of states, probability of being at 
certain states given evidence, etc. can be performed in specific software such as HUGIN. 
For determining the conditional probability of the binary state ‘Maintenance of keel stays 
not specified’, the first step is to quantify a basis probability for the event. Due to the 
poor accident data, estimation will be made here. There were 266 investigated accidents 
listed in the appendix of Mr. T. W. Ross 25. The estimated probability of this condition is 
1/266=0.3%. The next step is to determine the maximum deviation from the basis 
probability by expert judgment. There is only one parent variable for this state and 
consequently the wi is 1. Assume the probability distribution is 0.5 in -1, 0.2 in 0 and 0.3 
in 1. Calculated  
 %71.0)55.03.012.045.0(%3.0 failureP  
Up to now, the conditional probability table has been constructed and BBN has been 
linked to the fault tree. Further analysis can also be made based upon the data. 
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CHAPTER 7 HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS 
This chapter will address a modified framework based on the human factors analysis 
and classification system (HFACS) which was built for the aviation industry to 
investigate the role of human errors in lifeboat and its launching system accidents.  
7.1 MOTIVATION FOR CONSTRUCTING HFACS FOR LIFEBOAT ACCIDENTS 
Literatures indicated that human errors resulted in, or at least partly contributed to, the 
amount of 70%-80% aviation accidents. Thus, the human factors analysis and 
classification system (HFACS) was developed to investigate aviation accidents, basing on 
Reason’s ‘Swiss Cheese’ model for latent and active failures 26. It seemed the same case 
in maritime industry. Several studies also blamed on human errors as primary factor for 
a significant number of maritime accidents.    
There was a joint survey of lifeboat incidents by OCIMF, INTERTANKO and SIGTTO at 
2000. Among the 89 returned questionnaires, there are 30 incidents that can be 
attributed to the human errors, following the equipment failure. Human factors here 
consist of lack of proper training, lack of proper maintenance in accordance with 
instructions, lack of communications during operation and failure to follow correct 
procedure in Figure 24. Besides, the report also implied the indirect cause of accidents 
by human error in design. However, due to the fact that there is no case of lifeboat 
accidents happening under emergency, the evaluation of human factors contributing to 
lifeboat accidents would be unable to be performed. Among the published investigation 
reports, it is unable to see a human factors analysis.  
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Figure27. Primary Causes of Accidents of the Joint Survey by OCIMF, INTERTANKO 
and SIGTTO, 2000 
 
One condition should also keep in mind that the lifeboat is supposed to be launched 
during emergency. In an emergency event, people’s reactions could be different from 
person to person. In Svein’s book 27, he mentioned that people who survived after an 
accident were experiencing common emergency reactions, ranging from panic to apathy 
and not willing to assist each other. The other issue could be the crowd-binding problem 
which was estimated to be affecting 6% passenger activities in a given situation, for 
instance in a passenger vessel. Another study he presented in his book addressed that 
around 10%-25% people could have strong psychic reaction and 1%-3% people might 
lose mental or nervous breakdown. From the seafarer’s perspective, their behavior 
could be better after regular training.  
From another stand-point, improving the reliability of survival equipment which is high 
enough for an operator to trust plus reducing the operation time especially under 
emergency could be effective ways of managing the personnel safety.  
It can be understood from another point that there is requirement for improved design 
and higher reliability. Still, it can be seen from Figure 24 that human factor related 
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accidents also take up a significant part with none happened during an emergency.  This 
could be called for attention especially the qualification of seafarer’s actions is under 
stricter rules and regulations nowadays.  
Judging from above, there is need for a quantitative characterization of human errors 
relating lifeboat accidents. A HFACS for lifeboat accidents would be presented in the 
following section.  
7.2 HFACS MODEL CONSTRUCTION  
Originally, the HFACS is addressed in four hierarchical levels which a higher level will 
affect the lower level. The four levels are separately Unsafe Acts in Level 1, 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts in Level 2, Unsafe Supervision in Level 3 and 
Organizational Influences in Level 4.  
In the unsafe acts level, it can be classified into two categories: Errors and Violations. 
Errors can be subdivided into Decision-making errors; Skill based errors and Perceptual 
errors. Majority accident investigations were focused on this level. This is the level of 
personnel behaviors which were directly involved in the lifeboat operation.  In order to 
understand the underlying factors that cause the unsafe acts, the preconditions of unsafe 
acts level is needed. It can be divided into three categories which are environmental 
factors, condition of individuals and personnel factors. Environmental factors include 
physical and technical environment factors. Conditions of individuals include 
physical/mental limitations, adverse mental states and adverse physiological states.  
Personnel factors include crew recourse management and personnel readiness. The 
causal factors can be traced back to the upper level- unsafe supervision which is 
consisted of inadequate supervision, inadequate operation, failed to correct a known 
problem and supervisory violations. The organizational influences consisting recourse 
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management, organizational climate and organizational process show the latent failures 
and influence the lower level as described above. The overall diagram is shown in figure 
25. The following table 14 shows some example human activities of total 4 levels. It 
should be noticed that not all activities are included.  
Expert judgments should be made to deduce the probable causal factors of a higher level 
to the consequences in the lower level. The HFACS structure will be more useful if there 
is sufficient lifeboat accident data which can provide analysis support of the 4 
hierarchical levels. In the same way, a better quantitative analysis of human and 
organizational factors could be performed by assisting Bayesian Belief Network. 
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Table14. Examples of Causal Factors in Different Levels 
Level
1 Skill Based Errors Poor Technique Omitted warning item Omitted step in procedure 
 
Decision Errors Improper procedure Wrong response to emergency Poor decision 
 
Perceptual Errors Visual illusion Misjudged distance 
 
 
Violations Violated emergency rules Not-qualified for the mission 
 Level
2 Adverse Mental States Complacency Distraction Mental fatigue 
 
Adverse Physiological 
States Medical illness Physiological incapacitation 
 
 
Physical/Mental 
Limitation Incompatible physical capacity Insufficient reaction time 
 
 
Crew Recourse 
Management Failed to communicate Failure of leadership 
 
 
Personal Readiness Self-medicating Excessive physical training 
 Level
3 Inadequate Supervision Failed to provide guidance Failed to track qualifications Failed to provide training 
 
Inappropriate 
Operations 
Mission not in accordance with 
rules/regulations Improper manning Failed to provide correct information 
 
Failed to Correct 
Problem Failed to initiate corrective action Failed to report unsafe tendencies 
 
 
Supervisory Violations Failed to enforce rules and regulations Authorized unnecessary hazard 
 Level 
4 Resource Management Human resources (selection, training, etc.) Equipment/facility resources (poor design, unsuitable equipment, etc.) 
 
Organizational Climate 
Structure (Chain-of-command, 
Communication, etc.) Policies (Hiring/firing, drugs and alcohol, etc.) 
 
  
Culture Norms and rules, Values and beliefs, 
etc.) 
  
  Organizational Process Operations (Time pressure, schedules, etc.) 
Procedures (Standards, 
instructions, etc.) 
Oversight(Risk management, safety 
programs) 
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Figure28. Human Factors Analysis and Classification System for Lifeboat Accidents 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter will discuss the result from the previous chapters and propose some 
suggestions for further research.  
8.1 RESULTS DISCUSSION 
Even though lifeboat accident rates seem reduced today and less attention was paid 
compared to the previous years, it could still be dangerous and life-costing during 
drills and accident evacuation. So it is of importance to analyze lifeboat accidents to 
help improving lifeboat safety in an effective way. 
In this report, case analysis was presented in the beginning and scenarios were 
identified. This provides the basic explanations on why lifeboat accidents happened. 
This objective was discussed based on the corresponding accident reports. Based on 
this point of breakthrough, the causal factors were defined. The defined causal 
factors formed the foundation of the subsequent research. Following, influence 
diagrams were constructed. This gave a systemic understanding of the causal factors 
by classifying them in different levels. It can be seen that there is similarity between 
the influence diagrams and the human factors analysis and classification system. A 
coding structure is then proposed specially for the lifeboat accidents from the 
technical and operational aspects. This helped the construction of BBN in the next 
chapter. In this coding structure, accesses were also provided to help further 
quantitative analysis. No such coding work had been done and this work could be 
seen as the first one. BBNs were built in the next step based on the hybrid causal 
factor method. Based on the classification system in the previous chapter, technical 
failures were analyzed through fault trees and operational failures were analyzed 
62 
 
through BBN. With the data limitation, it can be seen that plentiful assumptions were 
made to simplify and assist the quantitative analysis. Still, it provided the data 
required for calculating the probability of a certain failure. Previous studies had 
looked at accident causes and consequences without giving probability estimations 
as well as the consideration of interacting events. This could also be regarded as the 
first application of BBN on lifeboat accidents. However, this research did not manage 
to demonstrate the overall picture of causal factors’ probabilistic importance because 
of the time constraint and poor data size. Up to this step, it is able to build an 
analytical model for lifeboat accidents. After applying BBN on lifeboat accidents, an 
extra analysis of human and organizational factor was performed due to the reason 
that lifeboat operating heavily relies on people. It helps a systemic consideration of 
human and organizational factors in the lifeboat accidents.  
8.2 FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
The study was restricted mainly by the recourses available and the limited time. 
Some suggestions are proposed for the future work. 
 Coding work: This part is carried out based on the understanding of some 
accident reports and might be aspects which were omitted. A more correct 
structure will help a better coding of lifeboat accidents and provide useful 
information for the later work. 
 Bayesian Network Development: Up to now, there is no available statistics on 
lifeboat accidents. Hence, no further lifeboat accident rates of different causal 
factors can be estimated. The causal relationships were only based on the 
subjective judgment.  More detailed BBNs could be constructed assisting with 
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more variables. By realizing this, a better understanding of what actually are the 
dominating factors that influence the lifeboat safety could be determined. 
 Variable States: For the simple calculation, variable states were restricted to 
only three conditions- negative, no influence and positive. In the actual case, 
results would be quite different if we adjust or add the variable states. As a fact 
of this, the 6 variable states which were mentioned in the reference article could 
be accepted. Concurrently, a higher requirement for coding the accident data. 
 Quantitative Analysis of Human and Organizational Factors: The last chapter has 
already proposed a structure for classifying and analyzing human factors. Some 
of the researches also proposed different methods to give quantitative analysis 
of human factors. A similar study could also be conducted.  
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 1: DESCRIPTIONS OF PROBABLE FAILURE SEQUENCE OF 
LIFEBOAT ACCIDENTS 
1.1 Lifeboat accident and fatalities of Hong Kong registered bulk carrier 
Lowlands Grace 
On 7th Oct, 2004, the crews of bulk carrier Lowlands Grace were mustered at the port 
lifeboat station for a drill while the ship was anchored 11.7 miles north of Hunt Point, 
Port Hedland, in Western Australia.  
There are totally 5 crews including the third mate, the fitter, an ordinary seaman, an 
able seaman and the third engineer. The third mate used the remote davit winch 
break cable inside the lifeboat to lower the boat. During the drill, the third mate 
halted the lowering process where the lifeboat was approximately 2-3m below the 
boat deck level and subsequently caused a momentary shock loads on the lifeboat’s 
hooks. Because of the undetected corrosion of the lifeboat after hook’s keel stays 
during routine maintenance and surveys, the load was strong enough to cause the 
keel stays to fail and separate from the keel block.   
After the hook assembly failed, its operating cable was under tension and 
consequently unlocked the hook mechanism and caused the hook to open. 
Due to the falling of the lifeboat’s stern, it produced the downward momentum and 
thereby causing the fall of the lifeboat stern and the forward swing of the boat with 
simultaneously forward hook’s rotating.  
  After rotating approx. 35 degrees with forward fall as pivot, the forward suspension 
ring contacted with the main pivot pin and from this point on, the open force on the 
forward hook mechanism was gradually increased with the further rotation of the 
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lifeboat. When the lifeboat had rotated to be just in the vertical position, the foredeck 
failed due to the maximum dynamic load induced by the swinging boat.  
With the lifeboat continuing rotating and swinging forward to approx. 220 degrees, 
the forward hook was subjected to increasing opening loads by the suspension ring 
acting as a lever. The forward hook’s operating cable bulked and then the cam 
release pin rotated until the hook opened.  
Since the lifeboat detached from both falls, it fell approx. 16m to the sea and caused 
accident and fatalities. 
The keel attachments for hooks on lifeboats are therefore recommended to be 
inspected to ensure the strength. Because of the deficiencies of survey and 
maintenance regimes, it is recommended more thorough regimes for condition 
monitoring of the condition of lifeboat keel connection arrangements. The design 
company was also notified to review the design of the on-load release system. 
1.2 Lifeboat accident and injury to crew aboard the Panama flag bulk carrier 
Cape Kestrel  
The Cape Kestrel anchored around 16 miles north of Dampier in Western Australia to 
load a cargo of iron ore for China at 11 Oct. 2001. The next day, the master decided to 
take a lifeboat drill. However, due to the ship berthed port side to the wharf, the 
starboard lifeboat was to be lowered and tested. 
Weather condition was good with little wind, calm sea and a low swell. Before 
starting the drill, the second engineer checked the starter panel for the davit winch, 
ensuring the power supply to the winch to hoist the boat on. The remote control that 
operated the winch was also checked and the indicator was lit indicating there was 
power when controlling the hoisting.  
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The mate, the third mate, the bosun, an ordinary seaman (OS) and the second 
engineer embarked the boat at the embarkation platform with all of them wearing 
helmet and a lifejacket. At around 0845 the mate used the remote control inside the 
lifeboat to lower the boat with the master watching from the bridge.  
After the boat contacted with the water, the hooks were released. The lifeboat 
worked perfectly with engine running. Meanwhile, on board the ship, two seamen 
greased the falls and sheaves. After about half an hour the hooks were reconnected 
and secured in position.  
An able-bodied seaman (AB) was standing by to recover the boat using the remote 
control unit for the winch motor. The AB pushed the hoist button under the recover 
command of the master, but nothing happened. The mate told the AB to inform 1st 
engineer of the problem when the boat was rolling in the swell and there was tension 
in the falls.  
The first engineer went to the starter panel located in the air conditioning room for 
the winches. Then he saw that the circuit breaker had tripped. After resetting the 
circuit breaker, it tripped again when the AB tried the remote control. The 1st 
engineer then told the mate that the boat should be lifted manually. 
Afterwards, the AB started to recover the boat using the winding handle. Because of 
the low recovering rate, the 1st discussed with the mate by radio and decided that 
there might be problems in the remote control. And then the AB stopped manually 
hoisting the boat. The 1st engineer asked the AB to notice any unusual sound from the 
winch motor which turned out to be no problem and nothing unusual.  
The 1st engineer replied to the mate’s request about why the hoisting was stopped 
and told him that he would hoist the boat from the lifeboat starter panel.  
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The 1st engineer asked the AB to notice him when the boat approaches the main deck. 
He then depressed the contractor in the winch motor starter box and started to hoist 
the boat. 
The master informed the mate to ensure that everyone left the boat at the main deck. 
When the boat was at the main deck level, the 1st engineer heard a signal from the AB 
and stopped recovery of the boat by releasing the contractor. The mate now told the 
master that the boat was too far from the deck and added that the boat was designed 
so that the crews can embark and disembark at the boarding platform. The master 
then instructed the mate to use tackles to bowse the boat into the side of the ship. 
However, the mate expecting that the limit switches could operate to stop the winch 
before the cradles came up against the stops on the supporting frames, ignored the 
commands of the master and told the 1st engineer to continue the hoisting. 
The master recalled that he thought the boat was coming in too fast and the limit 
switches did not seem to operate. The cradles reached the stops with the winch 
motor running and the forward falls parted. The boat hung vertically and soon the aft 
fall also parted. The boat fell about 20 meters, bow first, into the sea at around 0930. 
 Investigation showed that all ropes were heavily coated with grease which was in 
poor condition, discolored and with large amounts of hard particle contamination by 
visual inspection. The external strands were found to be extensively corroded 
varying along the length of the ropes with the most noticeably damaged regions in 
the location of failure after degreased.  
The master was not aware that the first engineer had been using the contactor on the 
starter panel to hoist the boat and the limit switches had been bypassed. It is also 
indicated that the disembarkation at the main deck would not necessarily prevented 
the falls from parting whereas the injury to personnel would be prevented.  
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In the design philosophy of the control circuitry, the winch motor incorporates limit 
switches to stop the winch motor just short of the stowed position and prevent over-
stressing of the wire falls. By manually actuating the contactor which bypasses the 
control circuitry, the protection against over-stressing of the falls, normally provided 
by the limit switches, were removed.  
From the operation view, it is not clear but probable that the clutch lever which will 
affect the winch speed by the position change was not correctly positioned. The 
master’s opinion was that the boat was coming too fast and the cradles went through 
the limit switches. 
The first engineer was unaware that by operating the winch with the motor 
contactor, all the electrical safety interlocks to prevent damage to the davits and the 
boats, had been bypassed. The chief engineer who was already aware of the manner 
did not notice the first engineer that the boat should be stopped before the limit 
switches were contacted. 
The mate realized disembarking at the main deck was not safe and ignored the 
master’s strong protest. He told the 1st engineer to resume hoisting the boat while he 
did not seem to aware that the 1st engineer was not using the remote control to hoist 
it and even if he was aware, he was also not aware that the limit switches would not 
operate. The noise in the air conditioning room would have affected the 1st engineer 
hearing the mate on the radio. In fact, the 1st engineer claimed that he had been 
relying on the AB to tell him when to stop hoisting the boat. When not having 
received any such signal from the AB and not having aware the limit switches had 
been bypassed, the 1st engineer continued operating the contactor and then heard 
the davits hitting the stops and unusual noises. 
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1.3 Investigation into the lifeboat accident onboard the French registered 
Antarctic support vessel L’Astrolabe 
In the investigation report published by ATSB, the 4-8 crew member of the French 
Antarctic support vessel L’Astrolabe was reported to be overboard at around local 
time 0400 and be deceased after his body was found at 0824 of 27th, Jan, 2005.  
The weather remained unchanged except the south-westerly swell height increased 
around 1.5m to 2m between the time of missing and recovery. 
 In order to keep the ship to head the swell, he maneuvered the ship from the helm 
position in the wheelhouse and thereby ignored observing the recovery operation.  
The mate drove the boat back to the port side of the supply ship and made several 
attempts from the astern of the falls hanging freely from the davits after they caught 
the 4-8 crew’s body.  The second mate was trying to grab the forward fall block and 
attach it to the forward fall hook on the lifeboat by leaning through the forward 
access hatch of the lifeboat. So was the second engineer at the aft end of the lifeboat. 
The falls were not attached to the lifeboat’s forward painter after released. Because 
of the swell, the people at both ends of the lifeboat had difficulties in grabbing the fall 
blocks and then placing them on the lifeboat’s hooks. The second engineer got his 
right hand caught between the block and hook assembly of the lifeboat when he tried 
to grab the swinging fall block at the 3rd time. His thumb of the right hand was almost 
severed. The second mate rushed to the aft and helped the engineer into the lifeboat. 
However, the lifeboat motion in the seaway was still unstable and it turned out to be 
difficult to attach the fall blocks to the hooks at both ends of the lifeboat. After about 
one hour of attempting, two painters were lowered from the supply ship to avoid the 
lifeboat collision with the ship. The falls were then raised a little and pulled closer to 
the ship by crews using boat hooks. Then they were lowered at a rate which is 
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adequate for the crews in the lifeboat to attach the blocks to the hooks. The lifeboat 
was then recovered from the water. The whole operation took about 70 minutes. 
Investigations showed that the vessel’s movement in the seaway made the lifeboat 
recovery difficult and resulted in damage to the lifeboat and its fittings. There are no 
‘hand holds’ that attached to the suspension ring and the fall block which means the 
crew in the lifeboat had to manually attach the blocks and rings directly. It also 
indicated that if the lifeboats were required to equip the foul weather recovery 
strops, it would have prevented the danger of the swinging fall blocks to the lifeboat 
crews. 
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APPENDIX 2 DISTANCE MEASURE FOR CASE STUDY IN CHAPTER 6 
R C E T Z1 Z0 Z-1 R C E T Z1 Z0 Z-1 R C E T Z1 Z0 Z-1 
1 1 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 0.46 0.54 1.54 -1 1 1 1 2.72 1 1.08 
1 1 1 0 0.09 0.91 1.91 0 1 1 0 0.55 0.45 1.45 -1 1 1 0 2.81 0.91 0.99 
1 1 1 -1 0.18 1 1.82 0 1 1 -1 0.64 0.54 1.36 -1 1 1 -1 2.9 1 0.9 
1 1 0 1 0.18 0.82 1.82 0 1 0 1 0.64 0.36 1.36 -1 1 0 1 2.9 0.82 0.9 
1 1 0 0 0.27 0.73 1.73 0 1 0 0 0.73 0.27 1.27 -1 1 0 0 2.99 0.73 0.81 
1 1 0 -1 0.36 0.82 1.64 0 1 0 -1 0.82 0.36 1.18 -1 1 0 -1 3.08 0.82 0.72 
1 1 -1 1 0.36 1 1.64 0 1 -1 1 0.82 0.54 1.18 -1 1 -1 1 3.08 1 0.72 
1 1 -1 0 0.45 0.91 1.55 0 1 -1 0 0.91 0.45 1.09 -1 1 -1 0 3.17 0.91 0.63 
1 1 -1 -1 0.54 1 1.46 0 1 -1 -1 1 0.54 1 -1 1 -1 -1 3.26 1 0.54 
1 0 1 1 0.27 0.73 1.73 0 0 1 1 0.73 0.27 1.27 -1 0 1 1 2.99 0.73 0.81 
1 0 1 0 0.36 0.64 1.64 0 0 1 0 0.82 0.18 1.18 -1 0 1 0 3.08 0.64 0.72 
1 0 1 -1 0.45 0.73 1.55 0 0 1 -1 0.91 0.27 1.09 -1 0 1 -1 3.17 0.73 0.63 
1 0 0 1 0.45 0.55 1.55 0 0 0 1 0.91 0.09 1.09 -1 0 0 1 3.17 0.55 0.63 
1 0 0 0 0.54 0.46 1.46 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 -1 0 0 0 3.26 0.46 0.54 
1 0 0 -1 0.63 0.55 1.37 0 0 0 -1 1.09 0.09 0.91 -1 0 0 -1 3.35 0.55 0.45 
1 0 -1 1 0.63 0.73 1.37 0 0 -1 1 1.09 0.27 0.91 -1 0 -1 1 3.35 0.73 0.45 
1 0 -1 0 0.72 0.64 1.28 0 0 -1 0 1.18 0.18 0.82 -1 0 -1 0 3.44 0.64 0.36 
1 0 -1 -1 0.81 0.73 1.19 0 0 -1 -1 1.27 0.27 0.73 -1 0 -1 -1 3.53 0.73 0.27 
1 -1 1 1 0.54 1 1.46 0 -1 1 1 1 0.54 1 -1 -1 1 1 3.26 1 0.54 
1 -1 1 0 0.63 0.91 1.37 0 -1 1 0 1.09 0.45 0.91 -1 -1 1 0 3.35 0.91 0.45 
1 -1 1 -1 0.72 1 1.28 0 -1 1 -1 1.18 0.54 0.82 -1 -1 1 -1 3.44 1 0.36 
1 -1 0 1 0.72 0.82 1.28 0 -1 0 1 1.18 0.36 0.82 -1 -1 0 1 3.44 0.82 0.36 
1 -1 0 0 0.81 0.73 1.19 0 -1 0 0 1.27 0.27 0.73 -1 -1 0 0 3.53 0.73 0.27 
1 -1 0 -1 0.9 0.82 1.1 0 -1 0 -1 1.36 0.36 0.64 -1 -1 0 -1 3.62 0.82 0.18 
1 -1 -1 1 0.9 1 1.1 0 -1 -1 1 1.36 0.54 0.64 -1 -1 -1 1 3.62 1 0.18 
1 -1 -1 0 0.99 0.91 1.01 0 -1 -1 0 1.45 0.45 0.55 -1 -1 -1 0 3.71 0.91 0.09 
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1 -1 -1 -1 1.08 1 0.92 0 -1 -1 -1 1.54 0.54 0.46 -1 -1 -1 -1 3.8 1 0 
 
RIF: Technician fails to detect keel stays condition Factors assigned by expert judgment (%) Normalized weights wi 
R: Rule/Regulation Deviation 50 0.45 
C:Process complexity 30 0.27 
E:Training/Experience of technician 20 0.18 
T:Time pressure 10 0.09 
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APPENDIX 3 CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY TABLE FOR CASE STUDY IN 
CHAPTER 6 
R C E T P-1 R C E T P-1 R C E T P-1 
1 1 1 1 0.09 0 1 1 1 0.09 -1 1 1 1 0.44 
1 1 1 0 0.10 0 1 1 0 0.09 -1 1 1 0 0.45 
1 1 1 -1 0.12 0 1 1 -1 0.09 -1 1 1 -1 0.49 
1 1 0 1 0.11 0 1 0 1 0.09 -1 1 0 1 0.45 
1 1 0 0 0.12 0 1 0 0 0.09 -1 1 0 0 0.46 
1 1 0 -1 0.15 0 1 0 -1 0.09 -1 1 0 -1 0.50 
1 1 -1 1 0.15 0 1 -1 1 0.10 -1 1 -1 1 0.54 
1 1 -1 0 0.17 0 1 -1 0 0.10 -1 1 -1 0 0.55 
1 1 -1 -1 0.20 0 1 -1 -1 0.10 -1 1 -1 -1 0.59 
1 0 1 1 0.12 0 0 1 1 0.09 -1 0 1 1 0.46 
1 0 1 0 0.14 0 0 1 0 0.09 -1 0 1 0 0.46 
1 0 1 -1 0.16 0 0 1 -1 0.09 -1 0 1 -1 0.50 
1 0 0 1 0.15 0 0 0 1 0.09 -1 0 0 1 0.46 
1 0 0 0 0.16 0 0 0 0 0.09 -1 0 0 0 0.47 
1 0 0 -1 0.19 0 0 0 -1 0.09 -1 0 0 -1 0.51 
1 0 -1 1 0.20 0 0 -1 1 0.10 -1 0 -1 1 0.55 
1 0 -1 0 0.22 0 0 -1 0 0.10 -1 0 -1 0 0.56 
1 0 -1 -1 0.25 0 0 -1 -1 0.10 -1 0 -1 -1 0.60 
1 -1 1 1 0.20 0 -1 1 1 0.10 -1 -1 1 1 0.59 
1 -1 1 0 0.21 0 -1 1 0 0.10 -1 -1 1 0 0.59 
1 -1 1 -1 0.25 0 -1 1 -1 0.10 -1 -1 1 -1 0.64 
1 -1 0 1 0.23 0 -1 0 1 0.10 -1 -1 0 1 0.60 
1 -1 0 0 0.25 0 -1 0 0 0.10 -1 -1 0 0 0.60 
1 -1 0 -1 0.28 0 -1 0 -1 0.10 -1 -1 0 -1 0.64 
1 -1 -1 1 0.30 0 -1 -1 1 0.11 -1 -1 -1 1 0.68 
1 -1 -1 0 0.32 0 -1 -1 0 0.11 -1 -1 -1 0 0.68 
1 -1 -1 -1 0.36 0 -1 -1 -1 0.11 -1 -1 -1 -1 0.72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
